From trough to peak, the Euro has risen 9% over a period of only two months. You wouldn’t ordinarily expect to see this kind of appreciation from a G4 currency, especially not one whose member states are on the brink of insolvency and which itself faces threats to its very existence. In this case, the Euro is benefiting from expectations that the European Central Bank (ECB) will be among the first and most aggressive in hiking interest rates. As I warned in my previous post, however, those that focus solely on interest rate differentials and ignore the Euro’s lingering Sovereign debt crisis do so at their own peril.
Indications that the ECB will hike interest rates came out of nowhere. Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, announced last week that it would be particularly aggressive in taking steps to deal with inflation. This caught the markets by surprise, since Eurozone inflation is still below 2% and GDP growth is similarly low. Later, Governing Council members Mario Draghi and Axel Weber (both of whom are potential candidates to replace Trichet when he steps down later this year), issued similar statements, and the question of rate hikes was suddenly changed from If to When/How much.
Futures markets are currently pricing in 3 interest rate hikes, which would bring the Eurozone benchmark rate to 1.75% by year end. According to economist Nouriel Roubini’s (who gained fame by predicting the financial crisis) think tank: “Jean-Claude Trichet has been careful not to commit to a series of hikes, but we believe that is what it will be. The ECB is bluffing. We think the ECB will hike by a total of 75 basis points, probably by August.” Axel Weber, himself, coyly echoed this sentiment: “I see no reason at this stage to signal any dissent with how markets priced future policies.”
On the one hand, the recent rise in oil prices strengthens the case for rate hikes. On the other hand, the EU does not consume energy at the same intensity as the US, which means that its impact on inflation is likely to be muted. In addition, while the ECB’s mandate is indeed titled towards price stability (rather than boosting employment or spurring economic growth), to hike rates now would risk endangering the still-fragile Eurozone economic recovery. Unwinding its quantitative easing would similarly add to the risk of another financial crisis, since banks still make heavy use of its emergency lending facilities.
Speaking of which, it’s still way too early to say that the the EU sovereign debt crisis is behind us. Despite the loans and pledges and bailouts, interest rates for all four PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain) countries continue to rise, and or nearing unsustainable levels. At the moment, currency investors have chosen to ignore this, since the EU has basically guaranteed them funding until 2013. What will happen then, or as the date draw near, is anyone’s guess.
In the end, one or more defaults seems inevitable. There is only so much that financial engineering can do to conceal and restructure debt which exceeds 100% of GDP in the cases of Greece and Ireland. If that were to happen, significant losses would be incurred by EU banks, which lent heavily to at-risk countries during the boom years. In order to minimize this situation, I think the ECB will probably continue to subsidize the banks via low interest rates.
Even if the ECB does hike rates, it will be extremely gradual. Furthermore, By the time Eurozone interest rates reach attractive levels, the other G4 Central Banks (with the exception of Japan) will probably already have started to close the gap. That means that interest rate differentials probably won’t soon be wide enough to lure more than a modicum of risk-averse investors. (Besides, if you assume a 5% chance of default, risk-adjusted rates are probably still negative).
In short, I think that the ongoing Euro rally is really just a short squeeze in disguise. Basically, speculators are conceding that shorting the Euro is both risky and unprofitable. (According to one hedge fund manager, “It was a very popular trade,” the portfolio manager says. A lot of us stuck with it, and it went wrong in January.”) In anticipating of higher future interest rates, they are preemptively moving to liquidate their short positions. However, not being short is not the same thing as going long. And until the EU sorts through the fiscal issues in a convincing way, I think it would be foolish to start making long-term bets on the Euro.
Forex Markets Look to Interest Rates for Guidance
There are a number of forces currently competing for control of forex markets: the ebb and flow of risk appetite, Central Bank currency intervention, comparative economic growth differentials, and numerous technical factors. Soon, traders will have to add one more item to their list of must-watch variables: interest rates.
Interest rates around the world remain at record lows. In many cases, they are locked at 0%, unable to drift any lower. With a couple of minor exceptions, none of the major Central Banks have yet raised their benchmark interest rates. The same applies to most emerging countries. Despite rising inflation and enviable GDP growth, they remain reluctant to hike rates for fear that they will invite further speculative capital inflows and consequent currency appreciation.
Emerging markets countries can only toy with inflation for so long. Over the medium-term, all of them will undoubtedly be forced to raise interest rates. The time horizon for G7 Central Banks is a little longer, due to high unemployment, tepid economic growth, and price stability. At a certain point, however, inflation will compel all of them to act. When they raise rates – and by much – may well dictate the major trends in forex markets over the next couple years.
Australia (4.75%), New Zealand (3%), and Canada (1%) are the only industrialized Central Banks to have lifted their benchmark interest rates. However, the former two must deal with high inflation, while the latter’s benchmark rate is hardly high enough for carry traders to take interest. In addition, the Reserve Bank of Australia has basically stopped tightening, and traders are betting on only one or two 25 basis point hikes in 2011. Besides, higher interest rates have probably already been priced into their respective currencies (which is why they rallied tremendously in 2010), and will have to rise much more before yield-seekers take notice.
China (~6%) and Brazil (11.25%) are leading the way in emerging markets in raising rates. However, their benchmark lending rates belie lower deposit rates and are probably negative when you account for soaring inflation in both countries. The Reserve Bank of India and Bank of Russia have also hiked rates several times over the last year, though again, not yet enough to offset rising prices.
Instead, the real battle will probably be fought primarily amongst the Pound, Euro, Dollar, and Franc. (The Japanese Yen is essentially moot in this debate, and its Central Bank has not even humored the markets about the possibility of higher interest rates down the road). The Bank of England (BoE) will probably be the first to move. “The present ultra-low rates are unsustainable. They would be unsustainable in a period of low inflation but they are especially unsustainable with inflation, however you measure it, approaching 5 per cent,” summarized one columnist. In fact, it is projected to hike rates 3 times over the next year. If/when it unwinds its quantitative easing program, long-term rates will probably follow suit.
The European Central Bank will probably act next. Its mandate is to limit inflation – rather than facilitate economic growth, which means that it probably won’t hesitate to hike rates if inflation remains above its 2% threshold. In addition, the front runner to replace Jean-Claude Trichet as head of the ECB is Axel Webber, who is notoriously hawkish when it comes to monetary policy. Meanwhile, the Swiss National Bank is currently too concerned about the rising Franc to even think about raising rates.
That leaves the Federal Reserve Bank. Traders were previously betting on 2010 rate hikes, but since these have failed to materialized, they have pushed back their expectations to 2012. In fact, there is reason to believe that it will be even longer than that. According to a Bloomberg News analysis, “After the past two U.S. recessions, the Fed didn’t start raising policy rates until joblessness had fallen about three- quarters of the way back to the full-employment level…To satisfy that requirement, the jobless rate would need to be 6.5 percent, compared with today’s 9 percent.” Another commentator argued that the Fed will similarly hold off raising rates in order to further stabilize (aka subsidize) banks and to help the federal government lower the real value of its debt, even if it means tolerating slightly higher inflation.
When you consider that US deposit rates are already negative (when you account for inflation) and that this will probably worsen further, it looks like the US Dollar will probably come out on the losing end of any interest rate battles in the currency markets.
Interest rates around the world remain at record lows. In many cases, they are locked at 0%, unable to drift any lower. With a couple of minor exceptions, none of the major Central Banks have yet raised their benchmark interest rates. The same applies to most emerging countries. Despite rising inflation and enviable GDP growth, they remain reluctant to hike rates for fear that they will invite further speculative capital inflows and consequent currency appreciation.
Emerging markets countries can only toy with inflation for so long. Over the medium-term, all of them will undoubtedly be forced to raise interest rates. The time horizon for G7 Central Banks is a little longer, due to high unemployment, tepid economic growth, and price stability. At a certain point, however, inflation will compel all of them to act. When they raise rates – and by much – may well dictate the major trends in forex markets over the next couple years.Australia (4.75%), New Zealand (3%), and Canada (1%) are the only industrialized Central Banks to have lifted their benchmark interest rates. However, the former two must deal with high inflation, while the latter’s benchmark rate is hardly high enough for carry traders to take interest. In addition, the Reserve Bank of Australia has basically stopped tightening, and traders are betting on only one or two 25 basis point hikes in 2011. Besides, higher interest rates have probably already been priced into their respective currencies (which is why they rallied tremendously in 2010), and will have to rise much more before yield-seekers take notice.
China (~6%) and Brazil (11.25%) are leading the way in emerging markets in raising rates. However, their benchmark lending rates belie lower deposit rates and are probably negative when you account for soaring inflation in both countries. The Reserve Bank of India and Bank of Russia have also hiked rates several times over the last year, though again, not yet enough to offset rising prices.
Instead, the real battle will probably be fought primarily amongst the Pound, Euro, Dollar, and Franc. (The Japanese Yen is essentially moot in this debate, and its Central Bank has not even humored the markets about the possibility of higher interest rates down the road). The Bank of England (BoE) will probably be the first to move. “The present ultra-low rates are unsustainable. They would be unsustainable in a period of low inflation but they are especially unsustainable with inflation, however you measure it, approaching 5 per cent,” summarized one columnist. In fact, it is projected to hike rates 3 times over the next year. If/when it unwinds its quantitative easing program, long-term rates will probably follow suit.
The European Central Bank will probably act next. Its mandate is to limit inflation – rather than facilitate economic growth, which means that it probably won’t hesitate to hike rates if inflation remains above its 2% threshold. In addition, the front runner to replace Jean-Claude Trichet as head of the ECB is Axel Webber, who is notoriously hawkish when it comes to monetary policy. Meanwhile, the Swiss National Bank is currently too concerned about the rising Franc to even think about raising rates.
That leaves the Federal Reserve Bank. Traders were previously betting on 2010 rate hikes, but since these have failed to materialized, they have pushed back their expectations to 2012. In fact, there is reason to believe that it will be even longer than that. According to a Bloomberg News analysis, “After the past two U.S. recessions, the Fed didn’t start raising policy rates until joblessness had fallen about three- quarters of the way back to the full-employment level…To satisfy that requirement, the jobless rate would need to be 6.5 percent, compared with today’s 9 percent.” Another commentator argued that the Fed will similarly hold off raising rates in order to further stabilize (aka subsidize) banks and to help the federal government lower the real value of its debt, even if it means tolerating slightly higher inflation.
When you consider that US deposit rates are already negative (when you account for inflation) and that this will probably worsen further, it looks like the US Dollar will probably come out on the losing end of any interest rate battles in the currency markets.
Chinese Yuan Will Not Be Reserve Currency?
In a recent editorial reprinted in The Business Insider (Here’s Why The Yuan Will Never Be The World’s Reserve Currency), China expert Michael Pettis argued forcefully against the notion that the Chinese Yuan will be ever be a global reserve currency on par with the US Dollar. By his own admission, Pettis seeks to counter the claim that China’s rise is inevitable.The core of Pettis’s argument is that it is arithmetically unlikely – if not impossible – that the Chinese Yuan will become a reserve currency in the next few decades. He explains that in order for this to happen, China would have to either run a large and continuous current account deficit, or foreign capital inflows into China would have to be matched by Chinese capital outflows.” Why is this the case? Simply, a reserve currency must necessarily offer (foreign) institutions ample opportunity to accumulate it.
However, as Pettis points out, the structure of China’s economy is such that foreigners don’t have such an opportunity. Basically, China has run a current account/trade surplus, which has grown continuously over the last decade. During that time, its Central Bank has accumulated more than $2.5 Trillion in foreign exchange reserves in order to prevent the RMB from appreciating. Foreign Direct Investment, on the other hand, averages 2% of GDP and is declining, not to mention that “a significant share of those inflows may actually be mainland money round-tripped to take advantage of capital and tax regulations.”
For this to change, foreigners would need to have both a reason and the opportunity to hold RMB assets. The reason would come from a reversal in China’s balance of trade, and the use of RMB to pay for the excess of imports over exports, which would naturally imply a willingness of foreign entities to accept RMB. The opportunity would come in the form of deeper capital markets, a complete liberalization of the exchange rate regime (full-convertibility of the RMB), and the elimination of laws which dictate how foreigners can invest/lend in China. This would likewise an imply a Chinese government desire for greater foreign ownership.
How likely is this to happen? According to Pettis, not very. China’s financial/economic policy are designed both to favor the export sector and to promote access to cheap capital. In practice, this means that interest rates must remain low, and that there is little impetus behind the expansion of domestic consumption. Given that this has been the case for almost 30 years now, this could prove almost impossible to change. For the sake of comparison, consider that despite two “lost decades,” Japan nonetheless continues to promote its export sector and maintains interest rates near 0%.
Even if the Chinese economy continues to expand and re-balances itself in the process (a dubious possibility), Pettis estimates that it would still need to increase the rate of foreign capital inflows to almost 10% of GDP. If economic growth slows to a more sustainable level and/or it continues to run a sizable trade surplus, this figure would rise to perhaps 20%. In this case, Pettis concedes, “we are also positing…a radical change in the nature of ownership and governance in China, as well as a radical redrawing of the role of the central and local governments in the local economy.”
So there you have it. The political/economic/financial structure of China is such that it would be arithmetically very difficult to increase foreign accumulation of RMB assets to the extent that the RMB would be a contender for THE global reserve currency. For this to change, China would have to embrace the kind of reforms that go way beyond allowing the RMB to fluctuate, and strike at the very core of the CCP’s stranglehold on power in China.
If that’s what it will take for the RMB to become a fully international currency, well, then it’s probably too early to be having this conversation. Perhaps that’s why the Asian Development Bank, in a recent paper, argued in favor of modest RMB growth: “sharing from about 3% to 12% of international reserves by 2035.” This is certainly a far cry from the “10 years” declared by Russia’s finance minister and tacitly supported by Chinese economic policymakers.
The implications for the US Dollar are clear. While it’s possible that a handful of emerging currencies (Brazilian Real, Indian Rupee, Russian Ruble, etc.) will join the ranks of the international currencies, none will have enough force to significantly disrupt the status quo. When you also take into account the economic stagnation in Japan and the UK, as well as the political/fiscal problems in the EU, it’s more clear than ever that the Dollar’s share of global reserves in one (or two or three) decades will probably be only slightly diminished from its current share.
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